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DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FOR CONVICTIONS
BASED UPON POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA
ALAN LEE*
T HE RECENT ADVENT OF DECRIMINALIZATION for adjudications based
upon possession of small amounts of marijuana has focused much atten-
tion upon the harsh immigration consequences of such adjudications for
the permanent resident alien. Under section 241(a)(11) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA),' an alien convicted of possession of mari-
juana is deportable, and only limited means of relief are available. Due to
its severity, however, the section has not been viewed with favor by the
courts or the Board of Immigration Appeals,2 and the result in recent years
has been the increased use of a number of ploys either to evade the word-
ing of the section or to grant discretionary relief. It is the purpose of this
Article to demonstrate that neither the current mood of the country nor
the history of section 241(a)(11) justifies the application of its present
severe penalties to the simple possession of marijuana. Section 212(a)
(23) of the INA,3 the counterpart to section 241(a)(11) used in exclusion-
ary proceedings before the alien legally acquires permanent residence or
entry into the country, will also be discussed when applicable. The prin-
cipal focus will be upon section 241(a)(11), however, since the inequity is
greatest when the alien is deported after he has broken many ties with his
native country and adopted this land as his own.
* B.A., University of California at Los Angeles; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University. The author is presently a sole practitioner in the field of immi-
gration law, and was 1976-77 Cleveland-Marshall recipient of the Sidney A. Levine
Award for legal writing based upon his work in this Article.
The author wishes to extend special thanks to Stephen Lazarus, Professor of Law at the
Cleveland State University, for his valuable assistance during the preparation of this
Article.
I Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970) pro-
vides that:
Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the order
of the Attorney General, be deported who . . . (11) is, or hereafter at any time
after entry has been, a narcotic drug addict, or who at any time has been con-
victed of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation relating
to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marijuana, or who has been
convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation govern-
ing or controlling the taxing, manufacture, production, compounding, transporta-
tion, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, or exportation of
opium, coca leaves, heroin, marijuana, any salt derivative or preparation of
opium or coca leaves or isoipecaine or any addiction-forming or addiction-sus-
taining opiate.
2 Created by Congress, the Board of Immigration Appeals is a quasi-judicial body within
the Department of Justice which adjudicates cases involving the immigration and national-
ity laws. It is comprised of a chairman and four other members appointed by the Attorney
General and serving at his discretion. Three members at all times constitute a quorum of the
Board, and except as modified or overruled by the Board or the Attorney General, decisions
rendered by the Board are binding and serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the
same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (19773.
' 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) (1970). 1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
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I. PRACTICAL REASONS AGAINST DEPORTATION
FOR POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA
In light of the increasingly liberal attitude across the country toward
marijuana possession, it is anomalous that the immigration laws still
demand that an alien convicted of possession solely for personal use be
deported. The mood of the country is strongly in favor of lighter sanc-
tions for those convicted of possession of marijuana, and ten states have
already decriminalized possession of small amounts for personal use.4
The National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) has estimated that twenty-
one percent of adult Americans or thirty-five million had tried marijuana
by 1976 with eight percent or thirteen million smoking it regularly,5 and
a Gallup poll taken in 1977 showed that twenty-four percent of the adult
American population had tried marijuana at least once. 6 The Harris poll
indicates that approximately one-half of the country favors its decriminal-
ization; higher NIDA estimates show that 86.3 percent of adult Americans
favor no imprisonment for first offenders, with 3.8 percent holding no
opinion and only 31.6 percent favoring some type of incarceration for
4 The following is an overview of state penalties for possession of marijuana: ALASKA STAT. §
17.12.110(e) (1975) provides a civil fine of $100 for possession of any amount in private for
personal use, and for possession of less than one ounce in public; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11357(b) (West Supp. 1977) treats possession of one ounce or less as a misdemeanor punishable
by $100 fine; COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22 -412(a) (Supp. 1976) treats possession of not more than one
ounce as a Class 2 petty offense and imposes a $100 fine; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1106 and tit. 22,
§ 2383 provide a civil fine of not more than $200 for possession of a usable amount of marijuana
not exceeding 1.5 ounces; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.15(5) (West Supp. 1978) treats possession of 1.5
ounces as a petty misdemeanor punishable by $100 fine and possibility of participation in a drug
education program for first offenders with increased penalties for second offenders; Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-29-139 (1972) states that conviction of first offenders for possession of one ounce or less
is an offense punishable by fine of not less than $100 nor more than $250 with increased sanctions
for repeat offenders; N.Y. PENAL LAw § 221.05 (McKinney Supp. 1978) treats possession of 25
grams or less by first offenders as a violation punishable by fine of $100; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
95(d) (4) (Supp. 1977) treats possession of one ounce or less as a misdemeanor punishable by fine
not exceeding $100 with possible increased penalties for repeat offenders; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2925.11 (Page Supp. 1977) treats amounts of less than 100 grams as constituting a minor
misdemeanor punishable by $100 fine; 1977 Or. Laws, ch. 745, § 15(4) (effective July, 1978) treats
possession of less than one ounce as a violation punishable by a $100 fine. All fines recounted here
are the maximum allowed by statute and the term "decriminalized" is used loosely to describe
those states which have reduced the penalty for possession to the status of fines. It is not intended
to signify that all of these states consider possession of small amounts to be a civil and not criminal
act, since some of the states have reduced the penalty while keeping the criminal label. The
effect of such labeling, and the possible ramifications of the distinction between civil and
criminal sanctions, is more fully explored in the text accompanying notes 71-79 infra.
South Dakota had decriminalized possession of one ounce or less in 1976 by terming it
a petty offense punishable by civil fine, but legislation in 1977 increased the offense to a
Class 2 misdemeanor punishable by 30 days imprisonment in a county jail or a $100 fine, or
both. S.D. Con. LAws ANN. § 22-42-6 (Special Supp. 1977).
' April 1976 survey presented in Nonmedical Use of Psychoactive Substances (NIDA
Publication, Washington, D.C. 1976). Results were also reported in NATIONAL GOVERNORS'
CONFERENCE CENTER FOR Poucy RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, MARIJUANA: A STUDY OF STATE
POLIcIES AND PENALTIES, pt. I, at 13 (1977), and 123 CONC. REc. S13,432 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1977).
' Gallup poll of April 1-4 (1977), reported in 123 CONG. REC. S9030 (daily ed. June 7,
1977).
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repeat offenders. 7  Organizations supporting decriminalization include
the American Bar Association, American Medical Association, American
Public Health Association, National Committee on Marijuana and Drug
Abuse (Shafer Commission), and the National Council of Churches.' In
addition, many bills are pending in the Ninety-fifth Congress which are
designed to effect this relief on the federal level.9
The lighter sanctions now urged in the state and federal legislatures
have greatly de-emphasized the onus on possession of marijuana. Unfor-
tunately for many aliens, lighter criminal penalties have also tended to
lull the alien into pleading guilty rather than contesting the charge. At the
present time, an alien is deportable even if the state considers the offense
of possession of marijuana a misdemeanor, 0 and unless the alien or his
attorney is aware of the immigration consequences he may plead guilty
because the penalty is less than the cost of contesting the issue in court.
The alien may then realize his mistake upon receipt of an Immigration
Service order to show cause why he should not be deported. At this
point his plea cannot generally be withdrawn, since the case has passed
7 Harris poll results were reported in 122 CONc. REc. S1097 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976).
NIDA poll results were reported in Nonmedical Use of Psychoactive Substances, supra
note 5, at 114, and MARIJUANA: A STUDY OF STATE PoaCIS AND PENALTIES, supra note
5, pt. I, at 35.
1 Survey reported in 40 CONSUMER REPORIs 265-66 (Apr. 1975), updated in Marijuana:
The Facts (NORML newsletter, Jan. 1976).
1 Currently awaiting action are H.R. 432, H.R. 2997, H.R. 4736, H.R. 4737, and S. 601,
which provide that private possession of one ounce or less of marijuana in a private or
public place for use and not with intent to distribute, transfer, or sell is punishable only by
a civil fine of not more than $100, and that such acts "shall not constitute crimes against
the United States and such person shall not be subject to arrest or suffer any disadvantage
or disability except that specified in this section." President Carter endorsed the view pre-
sented in these bills in his August 2, 1977 message to Congress on Drug Abuse Policy. See
123 CONG. REc. E5075 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1977). A more radical bill, H.R. 10055, would use
a civil fine not only for possession of less than one ounce, but also for distribution of not
more than one ounce of marijuana to any person if the distribution is not a transfer for
value or sale. Presently the most advanced legislation for decriminalization is contained in
S. 1437, the successor to controversial S. 1 which proposes to modernize the Federal
Criminal Code. S. 1437 as of this date has passed in the Senate and is pending in the House,
and provides that possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana is an infraction for which a
person cannot be arrested, but only issued a summons. A fine of $100 is assessed for
possession of 10 grams or less, and a $500 fine is levied for possession of 11 to 30 grams
provided the offender was convicted twice before of an offense relating to marijuana under
federal, state, or local law. Whether passage of S. 1437 will aid aliens on the theory that
federal decriminalization indicates a changed congressional policy toward marijuana, and
thus that aliens should not be deported for possession, is debatable. S. 1437 is a compre-
hensive revision of federal law, and has so far touched upon certain sections of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act relating to deportation without allowing relief to aliens con-
victed of possession of marijuana under section 241(a)(11).
Senator Cranston of California has dealt specifically with section 241(a)(11) in S. 158,
which states that relief shall be granted to an alien who is deportable by reason of not more
than one conviction for possession of marijuana or for distribution of a small amount of
marijuana for no remuneration. In addition, H.R. 7667, introduced by Representatives
Holtzman of New York and Dodd of Connecticut, goes a step further in providing that
aliens are not excludable under section 212(a)(23) who are convicted of possession or of
conspiring to possess or distributing marijuana for no remuneration; nor would they be
deportable under section 241(a)(11) if they have been convicted of distributing or con-
spiring to distribute marijuana for no remuneration, or have been convicted of selling or
conspiring to sell marijuana.
10 The Service has recently relaxed its policy of deporting all possessors regardless of
19771
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from the jurisdiction of the trial court and ignorance of the collateral
consequences of the guilty plea is no bar to its acceptance."
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The legislative history clearly shows- that Congress, in passing the
precursors to section 241(a)(11), was concerned with the trafficking of
drugs rather than possession for personal use. As originally introduced
in 1930 the first restrictive measure, House Bill 3394,12 included posses-
sors and users on its list of deportable aliens,' 3 but bitter opposition arose
to their inclusion before final passage of the bill and both "possession"
and "use" were finally deleted. 14
In 1940 an attempt to deport all violators of the Marijuana Tax Act
amount. Operating Instruction 242.1(a)(28) (issued April 27, 1977) allows the regional
commissioner discretion to decide whether deportation proceedings are appropriate in
cases in which lawful permanent resident aliens are convicted of possessing not more than
100 grams of marijuana:
Unless prior approval has been received from the regional commissioner, no
order to show cause shall be issued in the case of an alien who is a lawful per-
manent resident of the United States and whose deportability is based on section
241(a)(11) as one having been convicted of possession, importation or distribution
of marijuana for no remuneration: Provided further, that in the case of a convic-
tion for distribution without remuneration, the alien has been convicted of only one
such offense.
It should be noted that this relief is not mandatory, however, and that posssession of
small amounts of marijuana may still serve as the basis for deportation at the discretion of
the Service. By the wording of the instruction, it is also not applicable to aliens not in
lawful permanent resident status.
" See note 137 infra.
12 H.R. 3394, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930).
13 H.R. 3394, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) provided in part:
That any alien who . . . shall violate . . . any statute of the United States tax-
ing, prohibiting, or regulating the manufacture, production, compounding, posses-
sion, use, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, transportation, importation or
exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin, or any salt, derivative, or preparation
of opium or coca leaves, shall be taken into custody and deported in the manner
provided in section 19 and 20 of the Act of February 5, 1917 ...
14 The Act of February 18, 1931, ch. 224, 46 Stat. 1171 (repealed 1952) stated that:
any alien (except an addict who is not a dealer in, or peddler of, any of the nar-
cotic drugs mentioned in this act) who, after the enactment of this act, shall be
convicted for violation of or conspiracy to violate any statute of the United States
. . . taxing . . . the manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale,
exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, or exportation of . . . marijuana
. . . shall be taken into custody and deported in the manner provided in sections
19 and 20 of the Act of February 5, 1917 ...
The floor discussion indicates that the possessor was of no interest to Congress:
Mr. O'Connor of New York. Reserving the right to object, the gentleman's
amendment goes somewhat in the direction I had in mind. The criminal the gen-
tleman is trying to get at is the distributor.
Mr. Fish. The dealer and peddler; yes.
Mr. O'Connor of New York. But there is still in the bill a matter which I object
to, "possession."
Mr. Fish. But that would not make any difference unless the man is a dealer
or peddler. That is excepted.
Mr. O'Connor of New York. But this point has not been covered. The bill
reads "except an addict." I could imagine an alien child, not any addict, having
this stuff in its possession, somewhat innocently, or not criminally guilty, and yet
he could be deported. The gentleman does not want that.
Mr. Fish. I certainly do not. 4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss3/4
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of 1937,'" including possessors, was defeated. The initial wording of the
legislation, the Alien Registration Act of 1940,16 had been amended to
provide for deportation of any violators of the Act, 7 but the wording of the
statute as finally enacted was much milder in tone and did not make every
conviction under the Act a ground for deportation.'8  Shortly thereafter,
the Board clarified the legislative intent of the Alien Registration Act with
respect to possessors by taking note of the difference between the initial
and final drafts of the bill, and determined that Congress had not intended
to punish the alien convicted of possession under the deportation
statute.'9 The Board thought especially pertinent a Senate subcommittee
hearing in which Senator Danaher adverted to the severity involved in
making any violation of the Marijuana Tax Act a deportable offense.20
This same wording, excluding possession as a ground of deportation,
was preserved intact in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The
only significant change was that drug addicts were made subject to
deportation.2' Not until 1956 did Congress add language to the INA
which made an alien's conviction for violation of a law relating to the
illicit possession of "narcotic drugs" a ground for exclusion or depor-
Mr. O'Connor of New York. Why does the gentleman not leave out the pos-
session and simply make it seller.
Mr. Fish. I am willing to strike out the word "possession."
Mr. Johnson of Washington. I wish the gentleman would do that. The entire
House is unanimous on this. We want to get the big fellow.
72 CoNe. REc. 12367 (1930). See also Matter of V-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 62 (Bd. Imm. App. 1941)
for most of this account.
15 Ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed) provided in part: (a) Persons in general - It shall
be unlawful for any person who is a transferee required to pay the transfer tax imposed by
sec. 2590(a) to acquire or otherwise obtain any marijuana without having paid such tax.
16 Ch. 439, tit. II, § 21, 54 Stat. 673 (repealed).
17 The wording of the bill in this form was quoted in In re V-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 161, 163
(Bd. Imm. App. 1941). Deportation was imposed upon:
any alien, who at any time after entry, has been convicted of a violation of or con-
spiracy to violate any narcotics law of the United States or of any State, Territory,
insular possession, or of the District of Columbia, or of a violation of the Marijuana
Tax of 1937, or has been lawfully committed to a public or private institution as a
habitual user of narcotic drugs.
'8 Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, tit. II, § 21, 54 Stat. 673 (repealed).
l9 In re V-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 160 (Bd. Imm. App. 1941).
20 Senator Danaher. But granting that we include as a deportable offense a
violation of a State law, are you going to do it, as you say in line 13, at any time
after entry, and make it a more drastic deportable offense, for instance, than in the
case of a fellow who is guilty of a highway robbery?
Mr. Shaughnessy. That is true, Senator Danaher. There has been considerable
objection to it, because, like the discussion we had on Titles I and II, the man may
have lived here for so long, and he would be deportable on his first offense . . .
Senator Danaher. In other words, let me rephrase it: some of the most serious
felonies for which deportation may ensue require that they be committed within
five years after entry, or deportation will not follow?
Mr. Shaughnessy. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Danaher. Well, that is outrageous.
The Alien Registration Bill: Hearings on H.R. 5138 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Congress, 3d Session 33 (1940), cited in In re V-, 1 I. &
N. Dec. 161, 163 (Bd. Imm. App. 1941).
21 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, tit. II, § 241(a)(11), 66 Stat.
166 (amended 1965 & 1976).
1977]
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tation.22  Even here, the scanty legislative history indicates that the
intent of the House Ways and Means Committee was to eliminate traffick-
ing as opposed to personal use.2 3
After the 1956 amendments the courts proved reluctant to interpret
the language of the statute broadly, and the Ninth Circuit in a pair of
decisions, Hoy v. Mendoza-Rivera 4  and Hoy v. Rojas-Gutierrez,'-
upheld the aliens' contentions that marijuana was not included in the term
"narcotic drugs" as it appeared in the amended statute. In response to
these decisions, Congress passed the 1960 amendments bringing section
241(a)(11) to its modem form.26
22 Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, tit. III, § 301(b), 70 Stat. 575 (amending Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act § 241(a)(11) (subsequently amended 1960)).
11 The Committee concluded its report in the following words:
Drug addiction is not a disease. It is a symptom of mental or psychiatric disor-
der. Because contact with a drug is an essential prerequisite to addiction, the
elimination of drug servility on the part of addicted persons can best be accom-
plished by the removal from society of the illicit trafficker. It is to this end that
your committee has taken favorable action on H.R. 11619.
H.R. REP. No. 2388, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3274, 3281.
24 267 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1959).
25 267 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1959).
26 Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 9, 74 Stat. 504 (amending Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act § 241(a)(11)). Legislative history presented in [1960] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3134-35. It should be noted that although the legislative intent
in 1960 was clearly to deport possessors, the major premises underlying Congress'
decision to incorporate possession of marijuana into section 241(a)(11) have been sub-
stantially disproved. In the Senate Report accompanying the Act, the Judiciary Com-
mittee expressed fears that marijuana would prove to be a stepping-stone to harder
drugs and spur youth on to more violent crimes. S. REP. No. 1651, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE. & An. NEWS, 3124, 3135.
However, the Second Annual Report of the National Institute of Mental Health on
Marijuana and Health stated that there is no evidence that the use of marijuana causes
experimentation with other illicit drugs and that marijuana use does not appear to have
a causal role in the commission of crimes. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL IN-
sTrtrrE or MENTAL HEALTH ON MARIJUANA AND HEALTH (Feb. 11, 1972). The National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, an official body established by the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236, also came to similar conclusions. The Commission observed that the stepping-
stone theory avoids the real issue and has no basis in fact, and that rather than inducing
violent or aggressive behavior, marijuana actually inhibited the expression of aggres-
sive impulses by pacifying the user. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG
ABUSE, FIRST REPORT: MARIJUANA: A SIGN OF MISUNDERSTANDING 71-72, 87-88 (1972).
See the prepared statements of Lester Grinspoon, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychia-
try, and James B. Bakalar, Lecturer in Law, Harvard Medical School, in Decriminaliza-
tion of Marijuana under Federal Law: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Nar-
cotics Abuse and Control, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371-73 (1977) for similar conclusions.
Although the National Institute of Drug Abuse now appears to be concerned with
the effects of continuous hard use, an aspect which was not of importance to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, two recent studies conducted by the New York Academy on Chron-
ic Cannabis and the Center for Studies of Narcotics and Drug Abuse have indicated
that chronic use of marijuana does not seem to be accompanied by serious conse-
quences. Report of the New York Academy of Sciences Conference, reprinted in 122
CONG. REC. S2622 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1976); Report of the Center for Studies of Narcotics
and Drug Abuse of the National Institute of Mental Health, reprinted in 121 CONG. REc.
H6495 (daily ed. July 9, 1975). In addition, a federally funded study of long term users
(17.5 years average time of use) of extremely strong marijuana in Jamaica, which has
proven to be the most influential albeit controversial project to date concerning the long
term effects of heavy marijuana use, has shown no evidence of violence, psychosis, pov-
[Vol. 26:365
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An alien is currently subject to deportation if he has been convicted at
any time of a violation of law relating to the illicit possession of marijuana.
The statute is retroactive in effect, in that deportability has been upheld
for convictions occurring before possession of marijuana became a basis
for deportation. 27  No distinctions are drawn between traffickers and
possessors of small amounts,28 and violators are not eligible for voluntary
departure.2 9 Once conviction for possession has occurred, neither govern-
mental pardons nor court recommendations against deportation bar the
Immigration Service from instituting deportation proceedings, although
such measures are effective to stop deportation orders based on convic-
tions for murder, rape, or other assorted crimes involving moral turpi-
tude.3 ° It has been suggested that Congress has receded from its earlier
harsh position with the adoption in 1970 of 21 U.S.C. § 844 which
reduces the penalty for simple possession from a mandatory term of at
least five and up to twenty years to a maximum term of one year for
possession with a possibility of expungement for first offenders. The
cases which have touched upon the legislative history of section 844, how-
ever, are in disagreement. 3 ' On the whole the avenues of relief are
small, and it has been aptly stated that once the machinery of the law has
been set in motion, administrative and judicial authorities are powerless
to stop it, however much they may wish.3 2
erty, mental deterioration, apathy, or indolence. V. RUBIN & L. CoMrrAs, GANJA IN
JAMAICA (The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1975).
27 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 856 (1955); Rassano
v. INS, 377 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1967); Gardos v. INS, 324 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1963).
28 In re Amiet, 14 I. & N. Dec. 146 (Bd. Imm. App. 1972).
29 Immigration and Nationality Act § 244 (e), 8 U.S.C. 1254(e) (1970) states:
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deporta-
tion proceedings, other than an alien within the provisions of paragraph (4), (5),
(6), (7), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16), (17), or (18) of section 1251(a) of this title
... to depart voluntarily from the United States at his own expense in lieu of
deportation if such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney Gen-
eral that he is, and has been, a person of good moral character for at least five
years immediately preceding his application for voluntary departure under this
subsection.
See also In re Chang, Interim Dec. No. 2550 (Bd. Imm. App., Jan. 18, 1977).
30 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(1970).
It should be noted, however, that although this section expressly denies relief through
executive pardon or recommendation of the sentencing judge to violators of section
241(a)(11), the legislative intent of that section as applied to marijuana is unclear since
section 241(b) was passed in 1956, and because prior to 1960 section 241(a)(11) did not
apply to offenses involving marijuana. See text at notes 24-26 supra. While the inclusion
of marijuana convictions in 1960 did reflect a judgment that such offenses would be a
basis for deportation, the legislative history of that amendment does not suggest a
specific congressional intent that expungement of a marijuana conviction should be
completely disregarded for deportation purposes. See S. REP. No. 1651, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3124.
31 See In re Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651 (Bd. Imm. App. 1974), in which the Solici-
tor General expressed his view of a changed congressional policy in a letter to the Immi-
gration Service. But see Kolios v. INS, 532 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 884 (1976), in which the court stated that it would not expand the significance of
the 1970 amendments in light of their specificity.
32 Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1975).
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III. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR DEPORTATION
The most productive method available to the alien to obviate the
harshness of section 241(a)(11) is to avoid the wording of the section.
Since the 1960 amendments, successful attacks on the statutory meaning
have centered around the requirements of illicitness, possession or vio-
lation of any law or regulation relating to possession, and conviction. All
three requisites must be met before deportation proceedings can take
effect. One overall factor favoring the alien is that section 241(a)(11) has
been strictly construed by the courts on the rationale that deportation is a
harsh penalty - the equivalent of banishment.33
A. Illicitness
The issue of illicitness was discussed in Lennon v. INS.3 4 Ex-Beatle
John Lennon had been convicted of possession of marijuana in England.
He later entered the United States on a temporary non-immigrant visa,
and attempted to adjust his status to that of a permanent resident alien.35
The Service denied his application under section 212(a)(23), the exclu-
sionary counterpart to section 241(a)(11). In the Board proceeding,36
Lennon was found to be deportable based on his excludibility under sec-
tion 212(a)(23), but the Second Circuit vacated the order on appeal,
pointing out that "illicitness" implies guilty knowledge, and since British
law considers guilty knowledge irrelevant in possession cases the convic-
tion could not stand as a basis for denying adjustment of status.37 The
court based its opinion on the logic that if "illicit" merely meant "unlaw-
ful" the use of the term would be redundant, noting that harsh sanctions
should not be used where moral culpability is lacking.38
The Board had also recognized the validity of the "illicitness" argu-
3 Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948);
Hailer v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1968); Brancato v. Lehman, 239 F.2d 663 (6th Cir.
1956).
34 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 521 (1977).
3, Adjustment of status may be granted under section 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970),
as amended by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
541, 90 Stat. 2703, to change the legal posture of an alien already in the country from
non-immigrant to permanent resident at the discretion of the Attorney General. The
requirements for eligibility are that the alien must have been inspected, and admitted
or paroled into the United States; that he must be eligible to receive an immigrant visa
and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence; and that an immigrant
visa is immediately available to him at the time that his visa is filed. Excludable classes
under this section are alien crewmen, aliens admitted in transit without a visa under
section 212(d)(4)(c), and under the 1976 amendments aliens other than immediate rela-
tives as defined in section 201(b) who continue in or accept unauthorized employment
prior to filing an application for adjustment of status. However, note that nothing pre-
cludes these classes from going abroad and reapplying for a visa there. Under the 1976
amendments, the ban against adjustment of status for natives of the Western Hemis-
phere was removed.
36 In re Lennon, Interim. Dec. No. 2304 (Bd. Imm. App., July 10, 1974).
37 Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED.
538 (1977).
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ment, and based its finding of Lennon's excludability on the belief that a
person entirely unaware that he possessed an illicit substance would not
have been convicted in an English court.39 Since In re Lennon, the Board
has rejected overtures from the Service to reconsider its position on this
issue, 40 and in 1977 expressly adopted the holding of Lennon v. INS as
a rule of general applicability."
The Lennon case, however, should not be looked upon as the key to
invalidation of all foreign convictions as a basis for exclusion or deporta-
tion. It did not touch upon questions of foreign convictions per se, but
only upon foreign convictions based on laws which do not require the
element of guilty knowledge. There is clear authority to the effect that
foreign convictions may be used as grounds for deportation purposes.
42
Placing the Lennon case in perspective, it can be seen that it creates a
narrow exception in the interpretation of the word "illicit" when the
foreign statute requires no mens rea for conviction.43 Within the scope
of Lennon, then, the major argument will revolve upon whether or not
the foreign law falls in this category.
B. Possession or Violation of Any Law or Regulation
Relating to Possession
The second requirement of section 241(a)(11) is that, with regard to
marijuana, there must at least exist an offense for either possession or
violation of any law or regulation relating to possession. Five major rul-
ings have clarified the scope of these words.
In In re Amiet,44 an alien convicted of unlawful possession of mari-
juana for personal use in 1970 argued that the deportation statute applied
only to convictions based upon possession for trafficking purposes. Reject-
ing Amiet's claims, the Board pointed out that the legislative history of
39 In re Lennon, Interim Dec. No. 2304 (Bd. Imm. App. July 10, 1974).
10 In re Pasquini, Interim Dec. No. 2496 (Bd. Imm. App., June 9, 1976), af# d, 557
F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Awadh, Interim Dec. No. 2519 (Bd. Imm. App., Aug. 23,
1976).
41 In re Wolf, Interim Dec. No. 2561 (Bd. Imm. App., Mar. 2, 1977).
42 See In re Gardos, 10 I. & N. Dec. 261 (Bd. Imm. App. 1963), aff 'd, 324 F.2d 179
(2d Cir. 1963); In re Romadia-Herros, 11 1. & N. Dec. 772 (Bd. Imm. App. 1966); Brice
v. Pickett, 515 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1975). See also In re Pasquini, Interim Dec. No. 2496
(Bd. Imm. App., June 9, 1976), in which the Board upheld a deportation order based
upon a conviction for possession of marijuana in the Bahamas. Distinguishing In re Len-
non, the Board noted that under Bahamaian law guilty knowledge is essential to convic-
tion, since the statute, chapter 223, section 25(5) of the Statute Law of the Bahamas,
states that a person is guilty if the drug is found in his possession or kept in a place other
than a place prescribed for storage or keeping of such drug "unless he can prove the same
was deposited there without his knowledge or consent."
43 In In re Awadh, Interim Dec. No. 2519 (Bd. Imm. App., Aug. 23, 1976) the Board
further defined the limits of its stance in In re Lennon, holding that when the respondent
was convicted on a guilty plea of possession of marijuana in violation of the Canadian
Narcotic Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. N-2, § 3(1) (1970), he was amenable to de-
portation since the case law interpreting the Canadian Narcotic Control Act indicated
that scienter or guilty knowledge is required for conviction. The case was thus dis-
tinguished from In re Lennon, although the wording of both statutes was essentially the
same.
44 14 I. & N. Dec. 146 (Bd. Imm. App. 1972).
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the 1960 amendments proved otherwise, and that a reading as urged by
Amiet which equated illicit possession with trafficking would render the
word "traffic" meaningless.
45
Castaneda de Esper v. INS,46 Varga v. Rosenberg,47 and In re
Schunck,48 on the other hand, represent attempts to narrow the scope of
deportable offenses. In Esper, the Sixth Circuit held that an alien was not
deportable upon conviction of misprison of felony - concealment of
information relating to a conspiracy to possess narcotics - because mis-
prison of felony was not a crime "relating to the illicit possession of or
traffic in narcotic drugs." The Board has subsequently expressed con-
currence in this view by stating that the crime of concealment with
respect to felony possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is not
a deportable offense because concealment is a criminal offense separate
and distinct from the crime concealed.49
In Varga, the alien had been convicted under section 11721 of the
California Health and Safety Code for using or being under the influence
of narcotics. The court relied on a state court case for the proposition that
another person could administer narcotics to the user without the user
ever having been in possession. Since Congress was more concerned with
traffickers than with users, and since Varga at the point of use was hardly
in a position to traffic in the drug or to have possession which would give
him such dominion and control as to include the power of disposition,
the court concluded that he could not be deported under section 241
(a)(11). 50  The Service has since acquiesced in the Varga result,5 1
thereby effectively overruling prior Board opinions to the contrary. 52 In
the same vein as Varga and Esper, the Board has ruled in In re Schunck
that an alien is not subject to deportation when he is merely caught in the
same room in which marijuana is being used.
This same leniency has not been adopted when a conviction for
attempted possession is involved,5 4 however, and in Bronsztejn v. INS55
the Second Circuit reluctantly concluded that since the INA requires only
that a conviction' "relate" to the illicit possession of marijuana, the court
was bound by the clear language of the statute and could not classify the
crime of attempted possession as some sort of general offense. 56 The
45 Id. at 147.
46 557 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1977).
47 237 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
48 14 I. & N. Dec. 101 (Bd. Imm. App. 1972).
41 In re Velasco, Interim Dec. No. 2601 (Bd. Imm. App., July 25, 1977).
50 Varga v. Rosenberg, 237 F. Supp. at 284, 285.
5' In re Sum, 13 I. & N. Dec. 569 (Bd. App. 1970).
52 The Board had held to the contrary in In re Fong, 10 I. & N. Dec. 616 (Bd. Imm.
App. 1964), and In re H-U-, 7 1. & N. Dec. 533 (Bd. Imm. App. 1957).
53 In re Schunck, 14 I. & N. Dec. 101 (Bd. Imm. App. 1972).
5 Bronsztejn v. INS, 526 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Rosenson, 291
F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
962 (1969); In re G-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 353 (Bd. Imm. App. 1954).
m Id.
16 Id. at 1292.
[Vol. 26:365
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court distinguished Varga by pointing out that Varga's conviction was
based upon use rather than attempted possession, and that the latter
offense is sufficiently related to the power of disposal to come within the
statute.
5 7
The requirement that a narcotics conviction must at least involve
possession or violation of any law or regulation relating to possession per-
mits the practitioner with sufficient bargaining position to plead his client
to a lesser, nondeportable offense.5 8  However, the practitioner should
carefully evaluate the state laws to avoid being caught in a morass of
incorrect procedure, as occurred in In re Tucker.59 In Tucker the
California Superior Court granted the defendant a release pursuant to the
state expungement statute, section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code,60
set aside the guilty verdict, and allowed him to plead guilty to a general
offense. The Board held that this procedure was ineffective to bar
deportation. By its very terms, section 1203.4 had empowered the court
to expunge the conviction from the record only for certain limited pur-
poses, and in the Board's view could not be used to confer upon the court
the jurisdiction to substitute a plea of guilty for another offense in the
same code.61 The Board concluded that the correct motion should have
been made under section 1181(6) of the California Penal Code, which pro-
57 Id.
,s It should be noted, however, that the practitioner in California can no longer plead
his client down to charges of being under the influence of marijuana or being at a site
where marijuana is being used. These offenses were eradicated in California by the pas-
sage of Senate Bill 95 in 1975, which also decriminalized the use of small amounts of
marijuana. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11365, 11550 (West Supp. 1977).
However, it is possible that other measures, including the disorderly conduct charge,
may be substituted in California. In other jurisdictions which have preserved these of-
fenses in some form for cases in which marijuana is involved, they can be used as
lesser offenses to prevent deportation.
-9 Interim Dec. No. 2394 (Bd. Imm. App., June 10, 1975).
60 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1977) provides:
Discharged probationer; change of plea or vacation of verdict; dismissal of charge;
release from penalties and disabilities; certificate of rehabilitation and pardon;
application; pleading prior conviction in prosecution for subsequent offenses
(a) In any case in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of proba-
tion for the entire period of probation, or has been discharged prior to the ter-
mination of the period of probation, or in any other case in which a court, in its
discretion and the interests of justice, determines that a defendant shall be
granted the relief available under this section, the defendant shall, at any time
after the termination of the period of probation, if he is not then serving a sen-
tence for any offense, on probation for any offense, or charged with the com-
mission of any offense, be permitted by the court to withdraw his plea of guilty
or plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; . . . the court shall
thereupon dismiss the accusations of information against the defendant and he
shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the
offense of which he has been convicted. The probationer shall be informed, in
his probation papers, of this right and privilege and his right, if any, to petition
for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. The probationer may make such
application and change of plea in person or by attorney, or by the probation
officer authorized in writing; provided, that, in any subsequent prosecution of the
defendant for any other offense, the prior conviction may be pleaded and proved
and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted or the accu-
sations or information dismissed.
61 In re Tucker, Interim Dec. No. 2394, slip op. at 4, 5 (Bd. Imm. App. 1975).
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vides for modification by vacating a finding of guilt and reducing the
charge to a lesser included offense without a new trial.62
C. Conviction
In addition to illicitness and possession or any offense relating to
possession, section 241(a)(11) requires a conviction. Prior to 1940 sen-
tencing was also needed, 3 but the words "and sentenced" were elimi-
nated in that year. 4 The Board and courts in dealing with the conviction
aspect have most frequently focused upon the following questions: what
constitutes a conviction for deportation purposes, when does a conviction
become final, and what is the effect of an expungement on the convic-
tion.6 5 Each of these aspects of "conviction" will be examined in detail
in the following discussion.
What Constitutes a Conviction?
It is unquestioned that a conviction is triggered by a finding of guilt
or by a guilty plea. 6  It has also been unanimously upheld that a nolo
contendere plea is sufficient to establish deportability, though aliens have
objected on the ground that since a guilty judgment following such a plea
cannot be used in a subsequent unrelated civil proceeding, it should not
be used in a deportation proceeding.6 7 This argument has been rejected
on the theory that a conviction may be noticed for deportation purposes
since the existence of the conviction, not the facts underlying it, is the
only relevant issue.68
Conviction of a misdemeanor as well as a felony relating to possession
has been deemed sufficient for deportation,"9 the Board in Matter of
65 Id. at 3. The Board also recognized the appropriateness of a writ of error coram
nobis to withdraw the guilty plea following the expungement procedure when its re-
quirements for eligibility are satisfied. The current use of the writ is more fully dis-
cussed in the text at notes 134-40 infra.
13 Act of Feb. 18, 1931, ch. 99, 46 Stat. 1171 (repealed).
14 The Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 21, 54 Stat. 673 (repealed). The legis-
lative history of the 1940 amendments does not disclose any specific discussion as to the
reasons behind the change from "convicted and sentenced" to "convicted." See The
Alien Registration Bill: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H. R. REP. No. 1976 (1940), reprinted in 86 CONG.
REC. 8340, 9029 (1940). But see Arellano-Flores v. Hoy, 262 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1958),
in which the Ninth Circuit decided merely on the basis of the changed statutory lan-
guage that only conviction and not sentencing is required.
65 See Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 709 (1976) for discussion of this area.
"I The Ninth Circuit added in Buchowiecki-Kortkiewica v. INS, 455 F.2d 972 (9th
Cir. 1972) that a congressional classification permitting an alien's plea of guilty to pos-
session of marijuana to be the basis of deportation is not without rational basis.
67 See Ruis-Rubio v. INS, 380 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944;
Qureshi v. INS, 519 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Fortis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 576 (Bd.
Imm. App. 1974); Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
892; In re W-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 759 (Bd. Imm. App. 1954).
68 See cases cited in note 67 supra.
6' In re Bronsztein, Interim Dec. No. 2376 (Bd. Imm. App., Nov. 26, 1974), aff'd, 526
F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Varagianis, Interim Dec. No. 2537 (Bd. 1mm. App., Oct.
14, 1976); People v. Superior Court (Giron), 114 Cal. Rept. 596, 526 P.2d 636 (1974).
[Vol. 26:365
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Bronsztein71 stating that under the very terms of section 241(a)(11), no
distinction is made between conviction of a felony and conviction of a
misdemeanor. However, this does not cover the situation presented in
states which have decriminalized possession of marijuana, and have made
the offense punishable merely by fine. The issue as yet unresolved in
these states is whether a conviction can exist without the onus of impri-
sonment or the labelling of the offense at least a misdemeanor. The case
law is inconclusive, and the INS has shown reluctance to litigate this point
by electing not to pursue those cases in which only small amounts of mari-
juana are at stake.71
In reply to this writer's query whether a conviction lies in states like
Oregon in which there is no arrest and the penalty is the equivalent of a
traffic ticket, the General Counsel of the Immigration Service suggested
that In re McDonald & Brewster72 be examined in determining the issue. 3
In that case, the Board ruled that two aliens who possessed six marijuana
cigarettes when they attempted to enter the United States were not
excludable under section 212(a)(23) although one of them paid a fine in
mitigated forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a), since this was a civil
sanction and not a criminal conviction.7 4 The Board noted that the criminal
penalities for importation of marijuana are set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)
and (b).75  In view of McDonald & Brewster, it would appear that in
states in which possession of marijuana involves only civil sanctions, no
70 Interim Dec. No. 2376 (Bd. Imm. App., Nov. 26, 1974).
71 See Operating Instructions 2 42 .1(a)(28), supra note 10. H-owever, the fact that
the Service does not energetically pursue aliens adjudged guilty of possession of small
amounts does not moot further discussion of this issue, since the Service's policy is
purely elective and regional commissioners retain the option to approve deportation.
Neither does the probable non-forwarding of many records to the Service in decriminalized
states because of a lack of institutionalization moot the issue, since the Service is not
solely dependent upon the reporting practices of the states as its source of information.
But a problem which the Service may encounter in obtaining records in decriminalized
states after somehow obtaining news of the adjudication is that the record-keeping pro-
cedure for possession may provide for no records or for mandatory destruction of such records
after a period of time. Thus, it is possible that, as in a case in which the court seals the record, the
Service will be advised by state authorities that no record of conviction exists. See In re Lima,
Interim Dec. No. 2490 (Bd. Imm. App. Apr. 16, 1976). The full effect of a state's so advising,
however, was not totally resolved in In re Lima, since the case was decided on other grounds.
72 Interim Dec. No. 2353 (Bd. Imm. App., Mar. 13, 1975).
73 Letter of reply from Sam Bernsen, General Counsel, on file at Cleveland State
University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Library.
14 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (1970) provides:
Except as specified in the proviso to section 1594 of this tide, every vessel, ve-
hicle, animal, aircraft, or other thing used in, to aid in, or to facilitate, by ob-
taining information or in any other way, the importation, bringing in . . . or
subsequent transport of any article which is being or has been introduced or at-
tempted to be introduced into the U.S. contrary to law . . . shall be seized and
forfeited together with its tackle, apparel, furniture, harness or equipment.
" The Board rejected the government's theory that the defendants were also exclud-
able under § 212(a)(27) as aliens seeking to enter the country principally or inciden-
tally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest or en-
danger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States. The Board concluded that
while importation for personal use might be prohibited by law, it was not an activity
inimical to the internal security of the country.
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conviction within the meaning of the deportation law can exist. 76 This
situation is currently manifested in the statutes of Alaska, Maine, New
York, and Oregon. Both Alaska and Maine utilize a "civil" sanction, while
New York and Oregon employ the noncriminal "violation." 7  The practi-
tioner, however, should be wary of relying too much on this interpreta-
tion. It is not altogether clear whether the Board's decision in McDonald
& Brewster was based upon the fact that it was dealing with federal and
not state law, in which case the government's objection that state laws
interfere in a federal field is not present,78 or whether the Board decided
that no civil sanctions, federal or state, can serve as the basis for depor-
tation. Only further decisions will determine the parameters of the rul-
ing, but the general tone of McDonald & Brewster indicates the dominance
of the latter interpretation.7
9
" For a general background of the use of the civil sanction in marijuana reform
legislation, see MARIJUANA: A STUDY OF STATE PoucIEs AND PENALTIES, supra note 5
at pt. II, pp. 72-73. See also Decriminalization of Marijuana under Federal Law: Hearings
Before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13,
62-63 (1977).
77 ALASKA STAT. § 17.12.110(e)(1975) declares that possession of all amounts for
private use not in a public place is punishable by a "civil" fine not to exceed $100. ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1106 and tit. 22, § 2383 provide that possession of a usable amount
but not more than 1.5 ounces is a "civil violation" for which a forfeiture of not more than
$200 may be adjudged. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney Supp. 1978) and 1977
Or. Laws, ch. 745, § 15(4) (effective July, 1978) use the term "violation" to describe
possession of small amounts. Violations are not criminal in either state; the term viola-
tion is generally used to describe acts such as vehicle offenses, parking tickets, and
violations of construction regulations. In Oregon, the term is expressly defined as a civil
penalty under section 161.565 of the new law. In the preamble to the new law in effect
in New York, the legislature stated that "arrests, criminal prosecutions and criminal
penalties are inappropriate for people who possess small quantities of marijuana for per-
sonal use."
The National Governors' Conference Center for Policy Research and Analysis has
listed Alaska, Maine, Oregon, and South Dakota as the only states which have removed
the criminal label. See MARIJUANA: A STUDY OF STATE POLICIES AND PENALTIES, supra
note 5, pt. I at 111. However, it is apparent that this listing was compiled before the re-
cent changes in law in South Dakota, New York, Mississippi, and North Carolina since
the new penalty structure of these states is not reflected in the work. Id. at 98-104. South
Dakota can no longer be listed among the decriminalized states, however, since a posi-
bility of imprisonment for possession is currently in effect. S. D. COD. LAws ANN. §§
22-42-6 and 22-6-2 (Special Supp. 1977). Neither North Carolina nor Mississippi can be
considered to employ only civil sanctions. North Carolina considers possession of small
amounts a misdemeanor, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(d)(4) (Supp. 1977), while Mississippi
terms it an "offense," Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139 (1972), which is defined under the
code as meaning any violation of law liable to punishment by criminal prosecution, id. 9
1-3-37.
78 The government has successfully contended that immigration laws should be
controlled by federal criteria and not state laws in order to avoid the vagaries of differing
state statutes. However, it has been an equally well-maintained proposition that a con-
viction under state law is required in order to set the federal deportation process in mo-
tion. See note 93 infra. It is debatable whether these two divergent positions come in
conflict in cases like McDonald & Brewster since federal and not state laws were at issue,
and a narrow interpretation would confine the case to its facts.
7' Looking ahead, if this interpretation is accepted and a civil sanction is not sufficient
to deport, the issue may then revolve around the definition of what is "civil." In addition
to the four states mentioned in the above discussion which have abandoned the criminal
label, see note 77 supra, the other states which have decriminalized possession of varied
amounts of marijuana have given different terms to the offense while meting out similar
punishment. The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) 14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/v l26/iss3/4
DEPORTATION FOR MARIJUANA POSSESSION
When Does a Conviction Become Final?
Although the requisite substantiveness of the word "conviction" may be
fulfilled, the conviction will not prove sufficient for deportation unless the
element of finality is present. The Seventh Circuit pointed-out the need for
finality in Will v. INS:80
The parties have not cited, nor have we found, anything of sig-
nificance in the legislative history of the Act casting light on the
precise concept Congress sought to embody by the use of the term
"convicted" in Section 241(a)(11). However, it appears clear from
the Supreme Court's decision in [Pino v. Landon] and from past
administrative interpretation that the Section contemplates a
conviction which has attained a substantial degree of finality. 81
In Pino v. Landon, the Supreme Court had held in a per curiam deci-
sion that finality was not present when an alien was convicted and, after
being placed on probation for one year under a special Massachusetts
procedure, had his sentence revoked and the case placed on file. The
"'on file" status meant that the case remained on the records of the court,
and could theoretically be recalled and sentence imposed after a subse-
quent offense. The alien had argued before the First Circuit that, in that
designates a higher percentage of "civil" states than these four. It cannot be said that
NORML's statistics are wrong, since there is currently no bright line between civil and
criminal sanctions.
The National Governors' Conference Center for Policy Research and Analysis has
recognized this fact in MARIJUANA: A STUY OF STATE POLICIES AND PENALTIES, supra
note 5, pt. II at 74, and recommends a functional rather than labelling approach by ob-
serving whether important factors such as incarceration, custody, or a record exist. Using
this approach, it can be seen that Alaska, Maine, and Oregon are free from any of these
measures. New York provides for increased punishment of repeat offenders within a
three year period, but it is highly debatable whether the measure is enforceable, the
charge is non-criminal in character and one charged under the section would not be
fingerprinted or photographed, with the result that there would be no record of a con-
viction at the Division of Criminal Justice Services, the state's central repository of
criminal records. See Practice Commentary to McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New
York, Penal Law § 221.05.
Among the other decriminalized states, only North Carolina and certain portions of
Ohio have yet to implement citation procedures in place of full custody arrest, only North
Carolina has not provided some form of relief from the stigma of a permanent conviction
record, and only North Carolina, Minnesota, and Mississippi allow a possibility of in-
carceration for repeat offenders. See note 4 supra. It is clear that the similarities in treat-
ment among the decriminalized states outweigh the differences, and an effective argu-
ment could therefore be raised that possession of small amounts in most of the decrimin-
alized states is only a civil offense.
Furthermore, if a civil sanction is not sufficient to deport, it can be argued in states
which have not yet loosened their penalty structures to the point of decriminalization that
selective deportation, attributable solely to the state in which the alien is tried, offends
the guarantees of equal protection. Doubtlessly, this threat of lack of uniformity was of
concern to the Service in the promulgation of Operating Instruction 242.1(a)(28), which
restricts the prosecution of deportations in minor marijuana-possession cases. See note
10 supra.
447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971).
' 447 F.2d at 531.
S 349 U.S. 901 (1954).
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event, he could appeal from the sentence and secure a trial de novo in the
Massachusetts Superior Court.
Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Pino, the Board has found
no finality when the imposition of sentence by virtue of state law is post-
poned from day to day and term to term until further order of the court A
This is in contrast to situations in which the sentence is suspended either
by the passing of sentence and the suspension of its execution, or by a
suspension of the imposition of sentence through probation.
8 4
Even in situations in which sentence has not been suspended until
further order of the court, the finality of conviction can at least be post-
poned through the path of direct appeal. It was firmly established by the
Seventh Circuit in Will8 5 that so long as a direct appeal is pending, it is
sufficient to negate the finality of conviction regardless of the extremely
questionable likelihood of success on appeal.86 However, the court did
draw distinct boundaries on what would qualify as a direct appeal. A
blurring of the term would substantially undermine the process of depor-
tation for conviction, since the ingenious deportee could by a succession
of post-conviction proceedings postpone the finality of judgment. There-
fore, a motion in arrest of judgment was designated a direct appeal, while
a post-conviction petition and writ of error coram nobis were seen as
attacks of a collateral nature which would not affect the finality of the
conviction.
The Sixth Circuit has taken the same position in Aguilera-Enriquez v.
INS 7 by stating that not only a conviction but also a sentence and
exhaustion of procedures for direct appeal are necessary before the
requirement of finality is met.88  The circuit court found finality des-
pite the alien's argument that his motion to withdraw a guilty plea under
Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was in the nature of
a direct appeal. The court reasoned that a guilty plea waives objection
to the government's pre-trial conduct, as well as the right to direct appeal,
and draws the final curtain on a criminal proceeding.89 The court added
that before sentencing under Rule 32(d) a motion to withdraw a guilty
13 In re'Johnson, 11 1. & N. Dec. 401 (Bd. Imm. App. 1965); In re 0-, 7 I. & N. Dec.
539 (Bd. Imm. App. 1957); In re J-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 580 (Bd. Imm. App. 1957).
84 In re Johnson, 11 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (Bd. Imm. App. 1965). The weight of case
law states that an order of probation is conclusive evidence that there has been a con-
viction for at least some state purpose. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Gonzalez de Lara v. United States, 439 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1971); Arellano-Flores
v. Hoy, 262 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 921 (1959); In re 11- R-, 7
I. & N. Dec. 478 (Bd. Imm. App. 1957). The Ninth Circuit in Arellano-Flores v. Hoy has
reasoned that the change in wording from "convicted and sentenced" to "convicted" in
1940 indicates congressional intent that only conviction and not sentencing is required for
conviction, and therefore an order of probation rather than incarceration would not
afford relief to the deportee.
s- Will. v. INS, 477 F.2d 529 (7tli Cir. 1971).
86 Id. at 533.
87 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1050 (1976).
88 516 F.2d at 570.
89 Id. at 571.
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plea can be heard before the conviction is entered, but once sentencing
is complete the conviction is final for deportation purposes.90
The finality requirement has even reached the area of foreign convic-
tions. In Marino v. INS,9 the Second Circuit held that finality was not
present when an Italian tribunal found that the crime had been extin-
guished by Presidential amnesty and refused to hear the alien's appeal.
The alien had not accepted the amnesty, but was precluded from appeal-
ing the decision against his will. The court was of the opinion that had
Marino accepted the amnesty, the acceptance would have operated as a
waiver of his right to direct appellate review. 92
What Is the Effect of Expungement on the Conviction?
Relief from deportation can currently be sought under either state or
federal expungement statutes, depending upon whether the alien is under
state or federal charges. State acts have consistently been the source of
controversy in deportation proceedings because of conflicting policies in
this area of immigration law. In the interests of uniformity, the govern-
ment has attempted to do away with the vagaries of state law. However,
it has consistently been recognized that the state must consider that a
conviction exists for some purpose before the alien is deportable.93 Prior
to In re A-F-,94 the Board had held that aliens were not deportable whose
convictions had been expunged by the state, on the theory that the state
through this procedure was serving notice that it did not consider that a
conviction existed for any purpose.95  But in In re A-F-, the Attorney
General declared that he did not believe that the term "convicted" could
be regarded as flexible enough to permit an alien to take advantage of a
technical expungement, which was the product of a state procedure in
which the merits of the case and its validity had no place 8 The Ninth
Circuit concurred that with this assessment in Garcia-Gonzalez v. INS, 97 and
subsequent decisions have generally followed suit.98
90 Id. This case illustrates the prevalent concept that suspension of sentence
and probation do not prevent deportation. Here the alien pleaded guilty to possession
of cocaine, receiving a suspended sentence and probation. The court disallowed his mo-
tion for withdrawal of plea on grounds that sentencing had been completed and the con-
viction was final.
91 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1976).
92 537 F.2d at 692.
in re Johnson, 11 I. & N. Dec. 401 (Rd. Imm. App. 1965); In re Pikkarainen, 10
I. & N. Dec. 401 (Bd. Imm. App. 1963); In re L- R-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 269 (Rd. Imm. App.
1959); In re 0-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 539 (Rd. Imm. App. 1957); In re J-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 580
(Bd. Imm. App. 1957).
14 8 I. & N. Dec. 429 (Bd. Imm. App. 1959).
91 In re D-, 7 I. & N. 670 (Rd. Imm. App. 1958); In re S-11-, 7 1. & N. Dec. 495 (Bd.
Imm. App. 1957); In re H-, 6 1. & N. Dec. 619 (1d. Imm. App. 1955); In re 0- T-, 4 1. & N.
Dec. 265 (Rd. Imm. App. 1951).
96 8 I. & N. Dec. at 446.
11 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 840 (1965).
" Kolios v. INS, 532 F.2d, 786 (lst Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 884 (1976);
Tsimbidy-Rochu v. INS, 414 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1969); Cruz-Martinez v. INS, 404 F.2d
1198 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 955 (1969); Brownrigg v. INS, 356 F.2d 877
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There are indications that a new trend is developing, however. Both
the Second Circuit and the Board have signalled that state expungement
statutes may be given more effect in the future. In Rehman v. INS,
99
the Second Circuit held that because the alien's conviction for possession
of marijuana was accompanied by a state certificate of relief from dis-
abilities, and since full expungement of a federal conviction would have
been available in an analogous case, the alien was not convicted within
the meaning of the statute. 00 Thus, under the Rehman rule it appears
that whenever a state expungement statute has a federal counterpart, the
state statute will be given effect. 1 1
In addition, relief may be possible when the state expungement statute
attaches absolutely no remaining stigma on the alien. In the Board adjud-
ication in Rehman, the Board indicated its uncertainty as to this issue by
closely examining the disabilities remaining after conviction before con-
cluding that, since Rehman was barred from holding public office in the
state and evidence of his conviction could be used as a basis for an exer-
cise of discretion by state authorities in connection with licensing, he had
been convicted in the eyes of the state.10 2 The requirement that the state
must consider that a conviction exists in relation to state expungement
statutes was thrown very much in doubt by the sweeping language of
In re A-F- and subsequent rulings.1 0 3  The Board has further shown its
concern with this point in In re Cruzado'04 by stating that, even under the
Louisiana statute involved, the conviction could still be used by the state in a
proceeding to subject the party to subsequent prosecution as a multiple
offender, and in In re Varagianis10 5 by remarking that it was clear under New
Hampshire law that the conviction still remained for various state purposes.
Federal expungement statutes have also been the subject of much
discussion, but on the whole the federal statutes have enjoyed more
respect than their state brethren. There are currently three federal pro-
visions which have been proposed to stop deportation proceedings: 18
U.S.C. § 502, The Federal Youth Corrections Act; 18 U.S.C. § 4216, an
analogous section which invokes section 5021 remedies; and 21 U.S.C.
§ 844 which erases convictions for first offenders in simple possession
cases.
1o6
(9th Cir. 1966); Kelly v. INS, 349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 932
(1965); In re Espinosa-Rodriguez, Interim Dec. No. 2391 (Bd. Imm. App., June 2, 1975);
In re Rehman, Interim Dec. No. 2448 (Bd. Imm. App., Nov. 17, 1975); In re Cruzado, 14
I. & N. Dec. 513 (Bd. Imm. App. 1973).
99 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976).
100 Id. at 74-75.
'01 See 45 FORD-AM L. REV. 1247 (1977).
102 In re Rehman, Interim Dec. No. 2448 (Bd. Imm. App., Nov. 17, 1975). This po-
tential issue was not discussed by the Second Circuit, since it was assumed that Rehman
was susceptible to discretionary, though not automatic, forfeitures, and a rigid inter-
pretation of the word "conviction" would have subjected him to deportation.
103 See note 98 supra.
104 14 I. & N. Dec. 513 (Bd. Imm. App. 1973).
05 Interim Dec. No. 2537 (Bd. Imm. App., Oct. 15, 1976).
106 For an enlightening discussion of this area, see Note, The Impact of Expungement
Relief on Deportation of Aliens for Narcotics Convictions, 65 GEO. L.J. 1325 (1977).
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The Federal Youth Corrections Act precludes the deportation of aliens
who were under the age of twenty-one at the time of conviction if sen-
tence is passed under the Act. Similar state acts are now being given
similar effect. However, the road to recognition was difficult, and until
Mestre Morera v. INS 10 7 in 1972, it had been held under the umbrella of
In re A-F- that the setting aside of a conviction under the Act would not
bar deportation proceedings. In Mestre Morera, the First Circuit ruled
that a marijuana conviction in United States courts which is subsequently
set aside under the Federal Youth Corrections Act is not a basis for
deportation. The court concluded that the Act "clearly contemplates
more than a technical erasure; it expresses a Congressional concern which
we cannot say to be any less strong than its concern with narcotics, that
juvenile offenders be afforded an opportunity to atone for their youthful
indiscretions."' 08
Following Mestre Morera, the Immigration Service, the Board, and
the federal courts found themselves in a perplexing situation: would they
adopt the First Circuit's position, and if they did, would they respect only
the federal and not the state expungement acts on the ground that to do
otherwise would subject the conviction issue to the vagaries of state law?
On the other hand, to respect one and not the other would produce the
anomalous situation in which deportability would depend upon whether
the alien was tried in a federal or state court. The Ninth Circuit resolved
the problem by stating in Andrade-Gamiz v. INS10 9 that prior caselaw in
the circuit had already anticipated Mestre Morera and rejected its
holding. Conversely, the Board adopted the intermediate position of
respecting federal but not state expungements. 1" 0 Finally, the Immigra-
tion Service solved the problem by publicly adopting, on the recommenda-
tion of the Solicitor General, the position that marijuana violators
treated as youth offenders under state laws would be dealt with in the
same manner as such offenders under federal law."' Currently, then, an
expungement under either state or federal youth correction acts serves as
a bar to deportation.'1 2
The effect of 18 U.S.C. § 4216 is to provide that any adult offender
under twenty-six years of age at the time of conviction can in the discre-
tion of the court be sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act.
Thus, this section raises the age limit under which a drug offender can
qualify for the youth expungent statute. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (b)(1) pro-
10' 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972).
108 Mestre Morera v. INS, 462 F.2d at 1032.
109 No. 73-474 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 1973), aff'g. In re Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 364 (Bd.
Imm. App. 1973).
110 In re Zingis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 621 (Rd. Imm. App. 1974.)
.. In re Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651 (Rd. Imm App. 1974). See In re Lima, Interim
Dec. No. 2490 (Rd. Imm. App., Apr. 16, 1976). See also Operating Instruction 242.1(a)
(27).
"I In a recent case, United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976), the
court narrowed its interpretation of the effect of the Federal Youth Corrections Act
(FYCA) by declaring that it does not erase the record of conviction. However, the court's
ruling should not have great repercussions in the field of immigration since the Service
has abandoned the prosecution of youth offenders under the FYCA. See note 111 supra.
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vides that the conviction of any first offender for simple possession of
marijuana can be expunged at the discretion of the trial court, and the
discharge or dismissal is not to be deemed a conviction for purposes of
the disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon the conviction of
a crime. In one of the two decisions which have squarely considered this
section, the Second Circuit in Rehman v. INS" 3 stated explicitly that the
section is applicable to immigration cases. The court concluded that if
Rehman had been tried on federal charges rather than New York state
charges he would most likely not have been deportable, because under
section 844 he would have had no conviction for which he could be
deported. In the second case, the Board in In re Werk" 4 declared that a
conviction which has been expunged under the first offender provisions
of section 844(b)(1) may not be used as a basis for deportability under
section 241(a)(11). 115
An important question in this area is whether the order of the court
amounts to an expungement or an acquittal. An acquittal automatically
removes the grounds for deportation, while an expungement in most
cases does not. The Board has tended to draw a sharp distinction, and in
In re O'Sullivan"6 ruled that when the trial court granted a motion for a
new trial after conviction and sentence, and then dismissed the charges
upon the motion of the assistant prosecutor without setting out reasons
for its actions, the effect was an acquittal barring deportation. In In re
Cruzado,"7 the Board reaffirmed its distinction between expungement
and acquittal by opining that in O'Sullivan the procedure used was not
pursuant to a directive of state statute for all like cases, while in Cruzado
the setting aside of the conviction was done under a state expungement
statute which automatically awarded good behavior.
IV. ALTERNATE FoAMs OF RELmIF
As illustrated above, the most certain route of success in avoiding
deportation under section 241(a)(11) is through the evasion of its statutory
requirements. Nonetheless, when the requirements of "illicitness,"
"possession of or violation of any law or regulation of any law or regula-
tion relating to possession," and "conviction" have been fulfilled, aliens
have sought alternate relief in four ways: a) direct attacks on the con-
stitutionality of section 241(a)(11); b) post-conviction attacks of a
collateral nature; c) appeals for discretionary relief under the suspension
of deportation provisions of section 244(a)(2) of the INA or the waiver of
11 544 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1976). See text accompanying note 99 supra.
"l4 Interim Dec. No. 2589 (Bd. Imm. App., May 26, 1977).
15 In re Werk effectively overrules In re Amiet, 14 I. & N. Dec. 146 (Bd. Imm. App.
1972) in which the Board refused to extend section 844 relief to proceedings under
section 241(a)(11). The Service in Werk did not contest the use of 21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(1)
in deportation settings, and has recently agreed to extend the first offender provision
to exclusionary proceedings under section 212(a)(23). See In re Haddad, Interim Dec.
No. 2594 (Bd. Imm. App., June 28, 1977).
11s 10 I. & N. Dec. 1294 (Bd. Imm. App. 1963).
17 14 I. & N. Dec. 513 (Bd. Imm. App. 1973).
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excludability provisions of section 212(c); or d) a private bill for
relief.
A. Direct Constitutional Attacks upon section 241(a)(11)
Direct attacks on the constitutionality of section 241(a)(11) have by
and large failed. The plenary power of Congress in the field of immigra-
tion has limited the rights of aliens to gain meaningful review when the
power of Congress is directly challenged, and the Supreme Court in
recent rulings has refused to deny this power even while alluding to the
fact that alienage is now considered a suspect classification for pur-
poses of equal protection.""
An equal protection challenge specifically directed against section
241(a)(11) in 1976 was quickly dismissed by the Second Circuit on the
familiar ground that the power of Congress to regulate the admission and
expulsion of aliens is plenary and, absent patent abuse, is not subject to
judicial scrutiny. 1"9 An eighth amendment argument that deportation
for possession of marijuana constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
was upheld by an Illinois district court in Lieggi v. United States,1 0 but
overturned on appeal without opinion.' 2' The chances of prevailing on
this theory seem slim in light of recent decisions in other circuits
respecting the rule that, despite severe consequences, deportation is not
1i Aliens have generally been successful in those cases in which the states and not
Congress have attempted to curb benefits or rights. See Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (state welfare laws denying berefits to aliens not residents for certain
number of years held violative of equal protection); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973) (New York's flat prohibition against hiring of aliens in the civil service violative
of equal protection); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (membership to state bar limited
to citizens deemed unconstitutional); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) (Puerto Rico statute permitting only U.S. citizens to practice as private civil
engineers held unconstitutional); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (New York
statute barring certain residents from state financial assistance for higher education
struck down on equal protection grounds); Lefkowitz v. C.D.E. Enterprises, Ltd., 429
U.S. 1031 (1977) (decision of lower court which invalidated statute giving U.S. citizens
employment preference in public works construction summarily affirmed); Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (Virginia statute prohibiting federally li-
censed vessels owned by nonresidents from catching fish anywhere in the Common-
wealth struck down as unconstitutional).
When the power of Congress is challenged, however, the Court has affirmed the
principle established in earlier cases, such as Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893), The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), and Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522 (1954), that Congress has wide discretion over the field of immigration. In
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to sec-
tions 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2) which deny immigration benefits to the natural father
of an illegitimate child while granting them to its natural mother; in Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court declared that Congress possessed the power to condition
an alien's eligibility for medicare benefits on continuous residence in the U.S. for a five
year period and admission for permanent residence; and in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88 (1976) the Court skirted the issue where the federal civil service commission
hired only U.S. citizens and natives of Samoa by ruling that the case represented a
faulty agency regulation rather than the exercise of congressional power.
"' Guan Chow Tok v. INS, 538 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1976).
120 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
12 Lieggi v. INS, 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976).
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criminal punishment and therefore not within the eighth amendment's
prohibition. 122
The Second Circuit in Oliver v. INS 12 3 considered both eighth amend-
ment and due process arguments, and although rejecting both on legal
grounds, expressed the sentiment that the severity of punishment for
narcotics offenses may conflict with the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. The court pointed out that an alien convicted of the deport-
able offense of possession would not be deportable if the crime for which
he was convicted was one involving other acts of moral turpitude, pro-
vided that the crime was not committed within five years after entry.
Even if the crime led to deportation, the alien would be saved from
deportation under section 241(b) 1 4 if he obtained a pardon, or if the
sentencing court recommended to the Attorney General within thirty days
of sentencing that the alien not be deported.125 However, the court
finally rejected the due process argument on the ground that the validity
of distinctions drawn by Congress with respect to deportability is not a
proper subject of judicial concern. 126
It is apparent that on the basis of a long line of cases respecting the
plenary power of Congress in the administration of immigration law, the
practitioner should not rely upon suits directly challenging the constitu-
tionality of section 241(a)(11) when suitable alternatives are avail-
able.12 7
B. Collateral Post-Conviction Proceedings
As discussed in the Will case, 28 a direct appeal immediately stays
deportation, while collateral proceedings such as motions of habeas
corpus and writs of error coram nobis do not. This rule reflects the well-
founded fears of the courts that if collateral proceedings had such effect,
the finality of judgment could be postponed for years through a series of
post-conviction motions. 29  Collateral proceedings, however, are not
entirely without value. They may be effective if the alien has not yet been
deported and litigation is pending, since the alien can apply to the Service
122 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Carreon-Hernandez v. Levi, 543
F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 957 (1977); Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426
(2d Cir. 1975).
1- 517 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1975).
14 See note 30 supra.
12 Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d at 428. See note 30 supra.
1' The position taken by the Second Circuit is consistent with the Supreme Court's
stand on due process attacks on immigration laws as expressed in Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976), Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952), and Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
27 Compare, however, Justice Marshall's heated dissent in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1977) on the basis of faulty agency interpretation rather than the more convenient
congressional power argument, for signs of growing unrest in the Supreme Court over the
plenary power of Congress.
128 See note 80 supra.
129 See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
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for a stay of deportation pending the outcome of the proceeding even if
the order to show cause arrives before final resolution of the issue. 130
Substantively, there has been recent movement in the California state
court system involving the withdrawal of guilty pleas by aliens for posses-
sion of marijuana when the pleas were made in ignorance of the deporta-
tion consequences. In People v. Superior Court (Giron),'3' the California
Supreme Court found that when the defendant attempted to withdraw his
ignorant plea after being placed on probation, the trial court retained
jurisdiction of the matter and could liberally withdraw the plea under
California Penal Code section 1018, which allows withdrawal of pleas
before judgment for good cause shown, 32 because an order granting
probation under California state law is not considered a judgment except
for purposes of appeal.133 The supreme court then held that although a court
has no mandatory duty to inform aliens of the deportation consequences of a
guilty plea, it was within the trial court's discretion to allow withdrawal,
taking into consideration such material matters with which an accused
was confronted, and as to which he made erroneous assumptions, when he
entered his guilty plea.
A California appellate court in People v. Wiedersperg13 4 has extended
the supreme court's liberal allowance of vacation of an ignorant guilty
plea to a charge of possession to situations in which there has been a
judgment, and in which the California expungement procedure 5 has
been employed. The court stated that the trial court retained jurisdiction
of the case because the expungement under California state law did not
130 C.F.R. § 243.4 (1976). See also Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); Aguillera-
Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
l3l 114 Cal. Rptr. 596, 523 P.2d 636 (1974). See Note, Lawful "Impermanent" Resi-
dence: Deportation Without Warning for Minor Drug Offenses, 26 HAs'rMws L.J. 1299
(1974).
132 Penal Code section 1018 provided in pertinent part: "On application of the de-
fendant at any time before judgment the court may ... for good cause shown, permit
the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." Since Giron, it
has been amended to read "for a good cause shown." However, the California Supreme
Court has stated that the amendment was not a further liberalization of the section, that
it was without substantive significance, and that good cause must still be shown by clear
and convincing evidence. People v. Cruz, 12 Cal. 3d 562, 526 P.2d 250 (1974).
13 It may be argued by the Service that the use of the lenient prejudgment standard
of section 1018 was inappropriate in Giron, and that the stricter standard for withdrawal
of pleas should have been employed because the conviction had already become final
for purposes of immigration law. It is established that if the conviction is recognized for
any purpose by the state, it is final for immigration law purposes, see note 93 supra, and
in Giron the probation order was recognized by the state as final for purposes of appeal.
It is also established that an order of probation is a conviction sufficient for deportation.
See note 84 supra.
The Service may further argue that there was no basis for the California court's
action in federal law since FED. R. CiuM. P. 32(d) allows liberal withdrawal of pleas only
before imposition of sentence has been suspended. The validity of such a challenge is
debatable, however, since it can be argued that the state is not really contesting the
finality of the probation order, but is only vacating the basis for deportation; whichever
means it chooses to accomplish this is strictly a matter for state courts to decide, and
the Service exceeds its jurisdictional bounds in attempting to interfere with the California
Supreme Court's interpretation of procedural state law.
134 44 Cal. App. 3d 550, 118 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1975).
1'5 See text at note 60 supra.
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erase the conviction, and certain disabilities remained with the alien
after expungement. The alien could therefore attack the conviction
through a writ of error coram nobis, which lies to vacate or correct a
judgment when no other remedy is available, and directs its force against
the lawfulness of the original judgment and proceeding. A California
writ of error coram nobis may only be granted if the petitioner has shown
that the newly discovered facts did not go to the merits tried, that the
facts upon which he relied were not known to him and could not in the
exercise of due diligence have been discovered at any time substantially
earlier than the time of his motion for the writ, and that some fact existed
which without negligence on his part was not presented to the court at the
trial on the merits and which would have prevented the rendition of the
judgment if presented. Nonetheless, the Wiedersperg court was quite
liberal in accepting as conclusive of these requirements a sworn affidavit
of nondiscoverable facts, based substantially upon evidence that the
defendant had been in the country since the age of ten and had no out-
ward appearance of being foreign born, and upon declarations from
Widersperg's attorney that the sentencing judge would not have imposed
the sentence had he known of the consequences.1 36
Thus, it is apparent that the California state courts, through the use of
post-conviction collateral procedures, currently allow liberal withdrawal
of guilty pleas on charges of possession of marijuana when the alien was
unaware of the consequences of his plea. If the petition for withdrawal is
made during probation, Giron grants the trial court discretion to use the
liberal state policy of withdrawal before judgment. If made after
expungement, the plea may be vacated provided the lenient requirements
of a writ of error coram nobis are fulfilled.
It should be noted that the Service did not choose to challenge either
case, and it is too early to tell whether either holding will stand up in the
future against full scrutiny in light of the confused history of collateral
post-conviction attacks in immigration proceedings, and in light of the
accepted concept that an alien is not constitutionally entitled to know the
deportation consequences of his plea before acceptance.137
The theory behind post-conviction collateral proceedings in immigra-
tion law is that such proceedings erase the judgment of conviction and
nothing remains to form the basis of deportation.138  However, the
majority view adopted by the Board, and by the Second, Ninth, and
'3 People v. Wiedersperg, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57.
137 It is overwhelmingly recognized that an alien is not entitled to be made aware of
the collateral consequences of his plea before acceptance, since a judge cannot be ex-
pected to set out the full range of collateral consequences or even to anticipate what
those collateral consequences are. United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703 (2d
Cir. 1975); Nunez-Cordero v. United States, 533 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1976); United States ex rel
Durante v. Holton, 228 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1956); Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.
1976); Matter of Fortis, 14 1. & N. Dec. 576 (Bd. hmm. App. 1974); Matter of Marin, 131. & N. Dee.
497 (Bd. hnm. App. 1970); Joseph v. Esperdy, 267 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
131 Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir., rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 901
(1954).
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District of Columbia Circuits, focuses upon the motive for the collateral
proceeding. Under this view, when the record is opened to add nunc pro
tunc amendments recommending against deportation, the tardy recom-
mendations are void as clear attempts to circumvent the immigration
laws. 39 Decisions like Giron and Wiedersperg may be challenged on
the grounds that the vacation of a guilty plea based upon ignorance of
deportability is, like a tardy recommendation, made solely for the pur-
pose of evading the deportation consequences. The outcome, though,
is questionable at this time. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have
taken a more mechanical approach, looking to state procedure and not
motive in determining whether post-conviction collateral motions will be
given effect, 40 and it is certainly arguable that the vacation of an ignorant
plea is not as plain an attempt to evade the immigration laws as a reopen-
ing of the record to add a late recommendation.
The second basis for challenge - that an alien is not entitled to be
informed of the collateral consequences, including deportation, of his
plea before acceptance - will perhaps not be contested by the Service if
other state courts word their judgments in the same manner as the courts
of California. The California courts did not address the issue as one of
constitutional magnitude, but instead left it in the discretion of the trial
court directed to the promotion of justice to withdraw the plea.
Currently, then, the alien may be able to obtain relief from a guilty
13 Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States ex rel Piper-
koff v. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959); United States ex rel Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d
630 (2d Cir. 1926); Hailer v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1968); Marin v. INS, 438
F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Matter of S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 613
(Bd. Imm. App. 1962).
140 The Third Circuit has taken a mechanical approach in Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d
34 (3d Cir. 1963), focusing not on motive but on the completeness of the state procedure
in stating that when the judgment of conviction is set aside along with the indictment
with which the alien was charged, nothing is left upon which to base the order of
deportation. The court contrasted this situation with the finding of deportability by the
Second Circuit in United States ex rel Piperkoff v. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959),
in which there was a new trial in the same cause after the original judgment was va-
cated. One commentator has noted that the distinction drawn by the Third Circuit on
whether the original indictment was also dropped is strained, and that it was clear that
the court did not approve of the Second Circuit's harsh conclusion. See Note, Lawful
"Impermanent" Residence: Deportation Without Warning for Minor Drug Offenses, 26
HASTINcS L. J. 1299, 1325 (1974). A more mechanistic approach seems to have been
taken by the Seventh Circuit in Cruz-Sanchez v. INS, 438 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1971), in
which the court boldly stated without distinguishing motive or abandonment of indict-
ment that vacation entitles the alien to reconsideration by the Board. The Sixth Circuit
apparently has followed the Seventh Circuit's lead by stating in Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS,
516 F.2d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976), that if one is successful in
reversing the judgment and sentence, no conviction can remain for deportation purposes.
This approach, with its lack of concern over motive or dismissal of the original in-
dictment or information, has apparently been unconsciously assumed by the California
state court system in both Giron and Wiedersperg. The California courts in both cases
did not dwell upon whether the original information was dismissed, although such was
the case in Wiedersperg, nor did they contemplate the implications of the motive of
evading the deportation consequences. There is currently no common answer to these
approaches. Because of the clear difference between giving credence to the state court
procedure or looking behind it for the motive involved, uniformity will probably not be
attained in the near future, and resolution of the problem will vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
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plea through the use of favorable court procedures in California and other
states with similar procedures after probation or expungement if he was
unaware of the deportation consequences at the time he entered his plea
to possession of marijuana, though this position may be open to challenge
by the Service.
C. Discretionary Relief Under Sections 244 (a)(2)
and 212(c) of the INA
Discretionary relief is an open avenue to the alien, but provides many
uncertainties since judicial review is limited to those cases in which the
immigration judge's action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of dis-
cretion. 14' There are currently two provisions which afford this type of
relief: suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(2), and waiver of
excludability under section 212(c).
Section 244(a)(2) has extremely rigorous eligibility standards and is
inapplicable in a great majority of cases. The section provides that the
Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation for a con-
viction, including a conviction under section 241(a)(11), if the alien has
been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of
not less than ten years following the commission of the deed constituting
the ground for deportation, proves that during all of such period he has
been and is a person of good moral character, and is a person whose
deportation would in the opinion of the Attorney General result in ex-
ceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon the alien, or upon a spouse,
parent, or child who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.142  In addition, if the suspension of
deportation is approved by the Attorney General, it must also win the
approval of Congress before the suspension is final. 43 Although section
141 Jarecha v. INS, 417 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1969); Chen v. Foley, 385 F.2d 929 (6th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 838 (1968); Castillo v. INS, 350 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965);
Cubillo-Gonzalez v. INS, 352 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1965).
142 This section differs from section 244(a)(1), 3 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1970), which
allows more accessible means to suspension of deportation for crimes other than those
of an aggravated nature under section 244(a)(2). Violators of section 241 other than
those convicted of misconduct involving subversives, criminals, narcotics violators,
prostitutes, registration violators, and violators of certain statutes relating to national de-
fense are eligible for relief under section 244(a)(1) if they have been physically present
in the United States for a continuous period of at least seven years immediately pre-
ceding the date of the application, prove that during all of such period they were and are
persons of good moral character, and are persons whose deportation would, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the aliens, or to their
spouses, parents, or children if they are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence. Note that section 244(a)(1) provides that the alien
must be present in the country for seven years before the application, while section
244(a)(2) states that the alien must be present for ten years after the deed before he can
be considered for this type of relief. This fact alone makes section 244(a)(2) relief im-
possible for many people who are deported by the Service soon after the conviction. Also
note that the degree of hardship required under section 244(a)(1) is "extreme", while
that required in section 244(a)(2) is both "exceptional" and "extremely unusual".
143 Once the suspension is approved by the immigration subcommittees, however, it
is generally rubber-stamped through both Houses, and it has been aptly said that the
Houses of Congress "rely upon the recommendations of the judiciary committees,
which in turn rely upon the views of their immigration subcommittees." 2 C. GORDON &
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244(a) (2) relief is available, it applies to only a limited number of aliens who fit
its rigid requirements for eligibility.
A more effective form of discretionary relief is provided through
waiver of excludability under section 212(c). It should be noted that
this relief is not available to illegal aliens, but only to permanent residents
who have entered the country lawfully. Under this section, "aliens law-
fully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are
returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years,
may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard
to [the exclusion provisions] of this section." 144  Section 212(c) was
originally intended to cover only aliens seeking entry, "but experience in
administration demonstrated a need to apply it also to afford relief for
aliens in the United States."' 14 5 The section currently applies to depor-
tation proceedings under the rationale that the relief is granted nunc pro
tunc, and therefore cures the ground of deportability. 46
The key elements of eligibility for section 212(c) relief prior to the
landmark ruling of Francis v. INS147 in 1976 were a temporary visit abroad
not under an order of deportation, lawful permanent residence, and an
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years.
In Francis, the Second Circuit attacked the requirement of a temporary
sojourn from the country. The alien in Francis had been convicted of
possession of marijuana and had not left the country. The Board found
him ineligible for section 212(c) consideration on this basis. 148 The alien
argued that the statute as so applied created two classes of aliens, iden-
tical in every respect except that members of one class had departed and
returned to this country at some point after they became deportable. The
Second Circuit agreed that the Board's interpretation denied equal pro-
tection of the laws as guaranteed in the fifth amendment, and held that
even under the minimal scrutiny test applicable in this case, the distinc-
tion as drawn by Board policy was not rationally related to a legitimate
purpose of the statute. 4 9 The Second Circuit took great pains to state
that it was not challenging the power of Congress in the enactment of the
immigration laws,15° but was merely in disagreement with the Board's
interpretation of section 212(c).151 Since Francis v. INS, the Board has
elected to withdraw from its contrary position. 52
H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9(f)(4) (1976); Maslow, Recast-
ing Our Deporation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 343 (1956).
144 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1970).
145 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.4(a) (1977).
'41 In re G- A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (Bd. Imm. App. 1956). See also Vissian v. INS,
548 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1977); Francis v. Ins, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Silva,
Interim Dec. No. 2532 (Bd. Imm. App., Sept. 10, 1976).
147 532 F.2d at 268.
,. In re Francis, No. A12-081-215 (Bd. Imm. App., Aug. 15, 1974).
149 Francis V. INS, 532 F.2d at 273.
110 See discussion on unsuccessful constitutional challenges in text accompanying notes
118-27 supra.
I-" Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d at 272-73.
152 See In re Silva, Interim l)ec. No. 2532 (Bd. lmm. App., Sept. 10, 1976).
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The remaining elements of eligibility are lawful permanent residence
and lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years. These
requirements have not been affected by decisional law,15s except for a
1977 clarification of the interplay between "permanent residence" and
"lawful unrelinquished domicile" by the Second Circuit in Lok v. INS.1
5 4
Lok arrived in the United States in 1959, overstayed his nonimmigrant
status, and avoided detection until 1965, at which time he was ordered
deported and given the privilege of voluntary departure. His deportation
was subsequently delayed through a succession of private bills introduced
in Congress and, during the interim, he became eligible for immediate
relative -status through marriage to an American citizen. In order to apply
for his visa, Lok, who was still under voluntary departure status, embarked
for Hong Kong in 1971. Special permission for re-entry was granted
and Lok returned as a permanent resident in that year. One year later, he
pleaded guilty to possession of narcotics and was ordered deported after
sentence. Lok argued that he was eligible for section 212(c) relief, but
the Board stated that the seven-year period of domicile required by
section 212(c) must follow lawful admission for permanent residence, and
since Lok did not have a seven year period following lawful admission
for permanent residence he could not qualify for section 212(c) considera-
tion.155 On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed with this conclusion,
pointing out that it is possible for aliens to possess a lawful domicile in
this country without being admitted for permanent residence.15 6
The effect of the ruling is to broaden the purview of section 212(c)
relief to include all aliens who have established a lawful unrelinquished
domicile for seven years in the United States, whether the seven years
occur before or after the alien has become a permanent resident. 157
D. Private Legislation
The private relief bill is a last desperate gesture used by aliens to
153 In Guan Chow Tok v. INS, 538 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit affirmed
the validity of the seven year qualification period, and in Carrasco-Favela v. INS, 563
F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a Board decision that the seven
years were not fulfilled when the alien attained permanent residence in 1960, returned
to Mexico in 1970 to live with his wife, a native and citizen of Mexico, and commuted
daily to work in El Paso, Texas, for three of the four years preceding his 1974 arrest for
importation of marijuana. The court found as other facts indicative of Carrasco-Favela's
intent to give up his domicile and remain indefinitely in Mexico that he returned in
1970 to a house purchased before his 1968 marriage, that his wife did not apply for an
immigration visa until 1972, four years after their marriage and two years after their re-
return to Mexico, and that his 1974 return to the United States was involuntary.
154 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
'1s The Board holding is set forth in Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d at 39.
156 Id. at 40.
"' However, it should be noted that the Second Circuit remanded the case to the
Board for determination of whether the alien's seven years was lawful or not. The alien
had urged that either the Service's failure to enforce the 1965 order of deportation legal-
ized his stay or that his marriage to an American citizen in 1968 marked the beginning
of his lawful stay of seven years. However, the court denied his first theory under the
authority of Chim Ming v. Marks, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
911 (1975), and merely stated as to his second that the issue was best left to the initial
determination of the Board.
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forestall deportation when all other steps have failed. Its introduction
does not automatically forestall deportation proceedings, however, it
will act as a stay once the Judiciary Committee of either the House of
Representatives or the Senate has requested a departmental report.'5 8
It is literally the last available measure, since it will not be considered if
an administrative remedy exists or court proceedings are pending for the
purpose of altering the alien's status. 59
To obtain this type of relief, the alien must persuade a member of the
House of Representatives or Senate that he has a meritorious claim.
Upon introduction by the legislator, the bill is referred to the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Congress in which it was introduced. 60 It is
then transferred to a subcommittee for consideration.' 6 ' At this stage,
the practitioner is usually given the opportunity to present the alien's
story and to submit new evidence. 6 2  Committee action is usually
decisive and, if the Committee reports the bill favorably, the parent
House usually gives a rubber stamp approval.1
6 3
The chances of success through private legislation, however, are
almost nonexistent. From a high of 1227 private bills passed in the
Eighty-fourth Congress, the number in the Ninety-second and Ninety-
third Congresses and the first session of the Ninety-fourth have dwindled
to sixty-two, sixty-three, and sixteen respectively. 6 4 Correspondingly,
legislators have been less willing to sponsor private bills, and the number
of bills introduced has dropped from 7293 in the Ninetieth Congress to
2866 in the Ninety-first, 1085 in the Ninety-third, and 701 in the first
session of the Ninety-fourth Congress. 16 5
V. CONCLUSION
The history of section 241(a)(11) does not support its present harsh
sanctions when simple possession of marijuana is concerned. At the pre-
sent time, when marijuana use is so widespread and tolerated and a
number of states have either decriminalized or are contemplating the
decriminalization of possession of small amounts of marijuana, depor-
tation of aliens for the offense is inequitable. On the federal level, bills
have currently been introduced which would either decriminalize
possession of varied amounts or specifically provide for relief of aliens
caught in these circumstances. To an alien who stands accused of an
offense involving possession, however, this is a small consolation when
deportation proceedings are imminent. To prevent deportation, he must
explore the avenues of relief which are currently open to him. If a find-
158 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 7.12(c) (1971).
159 Id. § 7.12(b).
160 id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 [1975] INS ANN. REP. 139.
'6 Id.
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ing of guilt seems inevitable, the alien should attempt before judgment
to have the charge reduced to one of a non-deportable nature. If this is
not done and judgment is entered, he should base his defense, if any
exists, upon a federal expungement act or its state equivalent if he is able
to persuade the court to sentence him under such an act, or upon
statutory construction of section 241(a)(11)'s requirements for deportation
which include at least possession or a violation relating to possession,
knowledge of the possession, and a conviction which is final. These are
the most certain grounds for blocking deportation. Regardless of the
existence of these grounds, however, the alien should also prepare a plea
for discretionary relief under either section 244(a)(2) or section 212(c) if
he is so eligible, since such a plea may prevail despite the failure of other
defenses. Postconviction attacks of a collateral nature may also be
attempted when applicable, but with the attendant risk that the alien
may be deported before resolution of the issue. Finally, direct attacks
on the constitutionality of section 241(a)(11) should only be attempted
in the absence of another effective defense, in view of the overwhelming
discretion enjoyed by Congress in the administration of immigration laws.
Private legislation, which is the last resort, should not be relied upon to
prolong the alien's stay in the country in view of the past record of such
bills.
The courts, especially the Second Circuit, are to be commended for
having recently made available to the alien many of the avenues of relief
outlined above. In the future, courts should continue to interpret section
241(a)(11) narrowly as applied to possession of marijuana. To this end,
they should liberally dispense discretionary relief under section 212(c)
and the first offender and youth expungement acts when applicable, and
should, if the opportunity presents itself, listen favorably to an argument
that a civil fine for possession of marijuana cannot be a "conviction"
sufficient to support an order of deportation. Conviction implies a crime,
and when a civil fine is imposed the state is serving notice that it does
not consider the act to be worthy of criminal sanction.
Ultimately, the final action must lie with Congress, since the courts
can render only limited relief within the confines of the statute. It is
hoped that in light of the present changing attitudes toward possession
and the inequity of imposing deportation upon aliens for what is not
even considered a crime in some states, Congress will soon amend section
241(a)(11) to provide relief from deportation for aliens convicted of
possession of marijuana.
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